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Abstract
Parkinson’s law states that work expands to ﬁl lt h et i m ea v a i l a b l ef o ri t sc o m -
pletion and that the number of administrators in an oﬃce is bound to increase over
time. An unique laboratory to test Parkinson’s ideas are vehicle registration of-
ﬁces in Germany. Using their data we found empirical support for Parkinson’s law:
First, service quality is no better in oﬃces that have more staﬀ per case. Second,
service quality is worse if the service procedure is disaggregated into multiple smaller
sub-services. Third, the staﬀ size is a convex function of the number of customers.
These results are robust to speciﬁcations in various alternative models.
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1 Introduction
The general public often mistrusts the public services, and a bureaucracy is often seen
as a particular kind of joke, rather like ’celebrity’ and ’dirty’ jokes. While some social
scientists have pointed to the beneﬁcial eﬀects of bureaucracy, among them Max Weber
who argued that a bureaucracy has a positive eﬀect on the rule of law, the focus of many
economists has been on its disadvantages. In their theorizing about such organizations
they have discussed the reasons for their malfunctioning and slack (e.g. Niskanen 1971,
Wyckoﬀ 1990). The behavior of for-proﬁt ﬁrms is, at least partly, aligned with welfare
objectives. Most notably, it is argued that the pressure of competition eliminates or
reduces ineﬃciency, and even where market competition is not particularly strong, such
as in a monopoly, the proﬁtm o t i v eo fﬁrms stimulates cost minimizing behavior. The
public service sector by contrast is subject to diﬀerent rules. The pressure of competition
and a proﬁt motive are often completely absent.
Parkinson (1957) observed that, after the First World War, the number of oﬃcers in
the British Navy administration did not remain constant, it rose, despite the fact that the
number of ships and sailors had declined sharply. He concluded that work expands to ﬁll
the time available for its completion, and derived growth dynamics from the bureaucrats’
incentives to expand by creating a hierarchy whose maintenance and control dissipates
further work eﬀort. These observations and conclusions are called Parkinson’s law.
The early economic theory of internal organization is based on similar insights (Leiben-
stein 1966, 1978). Modern contract theory starts from the perspective that the public
administration is established and controlled by a principal — a politician, or, ultimately,
the voter. A rigorous and monolithic framework for studying these aspects was developed
by Laﬀont and Tirole in a series of papers, and in their monograph (1993). Their work
also triggered a lot of further research. Their analysis showed the theoretical limits to
the optimal governance of a bureaucracy and it came up with a wealth of results for the
1limits to eﬃciency imposed by the incompleteness of contracts, information asymmetries
etc. in controlling bureaucrats.
It would perhaps be best to downsize an oﬃce that has become too large. However,
this may not be feasible, partly because it is diﬃcult to judge from the outside whether
or not it is too large. It could be, for instance, that the only evidence the principal can
observe is that the administrators are hard working, while, for a variety of possible reasons,
these administrators themselves do not want the oﬃce to be downsized. In this case, the
latter will naturally deﬁne the tasks and procedures of the oﬃce in such a way that the
time available is ﬁlled. Administrators could use up the time with internal procedures,
such as writing and circulating memos and approving them. The excess staﬀ may also be
used for interaction with the clients. This may, but need not, be to the beneﬁt of clients.
Service for the clients may be improved, for instance, by increasing the number of counters
where they are served and this could reduce waiting time. In addition, the administrator
could become more diligent and could spend more time on reading the documents. This
could turn out to be to the customer’s disadvantage because waiting time would increase.
Furthermore, administrators could divide up the task of servicing a particular client into
several sub-tasks, thus ensuring that clients deal with a number of administrators instead
of one. Each of these would have to become familiar with the particular case in order
to contribute something to ﬁnishing it. This procedure also creates the need for more
supervision within the oﬃce. A hierarchical structure may be needed to coordinate this
process and it will require some eﬀort to evaluate and optimize it.
The purpose of this paper is to see Parkinson’s theory at work. Therefore, we had
to identify a bureaucratic setting with a clear one-dimensional output with measurable
quality. As bureaucracies are mostly complex and highly integrated organizations this
was very diﬃcult. So we are especially glad that we could detect a setting that serves as
an unique laboratory to test Parkinson’s ideas. We compare about 400 German motor
vehicle registration oﬃces and consider whether more staﬀ will improve the quality of the
public service or make it deteriorate. These local oﬃces have a simple one-dimensional
task that allows service quality to be measured, this is the time it takes for a client to
register a car. We collected the relevant data in a survey and the following are the key
2ﬁndings of a multivariate analysis. First, there is considerable variance with respect to
both the ratio between the number of staﬀ available and the number of clients served
and also with respect to the average time needed to complete cases. However, the service
time is no shorter in oﬃces where there was more staﬀ per case. Second, if processing
the cases of single clients is more disaggregated, there is a tendency for average duration
to increase. Third, the staﬀ-per-case-ratio in the registration oﬃces increases more than
proportionally with the number of cases.
There are a number of other studies on Parkinson’s ideas. Behavioral scientists have
studied extensively the relationship between time available and the time needed to com-
plete a task.1 Brannon, Hershberger and Brock (1999) provide a literature survey sug-
gesting that Parkinson’s law is widely, but not unanimously, accepted among sociologists
and in the organizational behavior and management literature. They also provide new
experimental evidence that is in line with the law. Moss (1978) used data from the Nat-
ural Environment Research Council’s (NERC) report. His data suggest that the number
of administrative staﬀ within NERC bodies is a function of total staﬀ and the number of
locations/addresses of the respective body. His result triggered further correspondence in
Nature (Flux 1980, Gray 1980). In management science Gutierrez and Kouvelis (1991)
took up Parkinson’s time dimension aspect. They formalized and extended Parkinson’s
theory for project management with special regard to project completion time. Other
aspects of Parkinson’s law were analyzed by Breton and Wintrobe (1979, 1982). Ac-
cording to them, administrators maximize power by accumulating the loyalty of theirs
subordinates. In times of declining budgets, the subordinates have to be promoted as a
reward for their loyalty and to save them from dismissal. Budget cuts may then lower the
output but lead to an increase in the administrator - subordinate proportion. This theory
explains some of Parkinson’s observations and McKee and Wintrobe (1993) test it. They
ﬁnd empirical support in the Canadian public school system and in the US steel indus-
1The ﬁrst experiments were done by Aronson and Gerard (1966), Aronson and Landy (1967), and
Bryan and Locke (1967). They all succeed in replicating Parkinson’s observation. Later, Orpen and
Riese (1973) failed to replicate Parkinson’s results, whereas both Latham and Locke (1975) and Peters,
O’Connor, Pooyan and Quick (1984) in their ﬁeld studies again succeeded.
3try. O’Toole, Jr., and Meier (2004) ﬁnd evidence that contracting in education implies
more administration there and vice versa. The analysis by Boyne (2003) concludes that
the most likely ways of improving the service are to provide extra resources and better
management. This ﬁnding is in contrast with our ﬁndings, where more resources seem to
have no inﬂuence on service quality.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide information on the institu-
tional background of our setting. In Section 3 we review Parkinson’s ideas and formulate
three empirical hypotheses which we test in section 4. In Subsection 4.1 we describe
the data set. The empirical model and estimation methods are presented in Subsection
4.2. Results are given and explained in Subsection 4.3. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 Institutional Framework
Input and output of bureaucracies is generally multi-dimensional. On the one hand,
diﬀerences in wage structures, regional or local legislation, and technological endowment
can result in heterogenous input. On the other hand, most oﬃces, especially in the Anglo
Saxon world, oﬀer more than one service to their customers. Thus their output is not
one-dimensional and may be diﬃcult to measure.
Where both inputs and outputs diﬀer in more than one aspect, it is hardly possible to
measure their eﬃciency. However, we were able to identify a bureaucracy that provides
a service whose eﬃciency is easy to measure because, although there are several input
dimensions, there is only one output dimension. This is the processing of motor vehicle
registrations in Germany.
There is a uniform pattern for car registration. All departments carry out the same
task under comparable technological constraints and under very similar administrative
wage regimes. All cars and all car owners must be registered. Federal law is applied
in all local administrative districts. The oﬃces produce only one product that is fully
standardized countrywide: car registration. Product quality diﬀers among oﬃces along
one output dimension only. This is the time required for a car to be registered or, put
4diﬀerently, the time it takes a customer from entering the oﬃce to leaving it can diﬀer
widely. This is the one and only output dimension that creates the quality diﬀerences
between oﬃces.
Within the common legal and wage structure framework the local administrative dis-
tricts themselves organize the registration process and structure the oﬃces. There is,
therefore, considerable variation with several important input dimensions. These are the
number of employees and their full-time equivalents per car registration, the overall size
of the local oﬃce, the way the oﬃce is organized in terms of one-stop versus several-stop
agencies. There is, also, considerable variation in the average time it takes a client to
register a car, which is, as mentioned above, the measure of output quality for this public
service.2
Thus, the bureaucratic setting of the vehicle registration process in Germany oﬀers a
rare opportunity to measure eﬃciency in a bureaucracy and, hence to test Parkinson’s
law.
3 Distilling Parkinson’s ideas
50 years ago, C. Northcote Parkinson published his book "Parkinson’s Law and Other
Studies in Administration". It describes the time consumption and development of size
in a bureaucracy. Parkinson noted that work expands to ﬁll the time available for its
completion and stated this as follows (1957, 2).
Granted that work (and especially paperwork) is thus elastic in its demand
o nt i m e ,i ti sm a n i f e s tt h a tt h e r en e e db el i t t l eo rn or e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h e
work to be done and the size of the staﬀ to which it might be assigned.
He illustrated his ﬁndings by comparing the amount of time an old lady might need
to write and send a postcard with the amount a busy manager might need. The lady can
spend a whole day getting nicely dressed, looking in various shops for a suitable card,
2We use service quality, service time, waiting time, and duration as synonyms. We always mean the
time from entering the oﬃce building to leaving it, i.e. the sum of pure waiting and service times.
5writing it in a pleasant café, and taking it to the post oﬃce, but the manager only needs
a few minutes to write and send oﬀ his card. According to Parkinson (1957, 2) the reason
is that "[t]he thing to be done swells in importance and complexity in a direct ratio with
t h et i m et ob es p e n t " .
All other things equal, additional staﬀ adds time to the overall time budget of the
bureau. Consequently, all employees have more time to complete the work to be done.
So if, in our context, additional staﬀ is employed, all staﬀ m e m b e r sh a v em o r et i m ef o ra
given number of car registrations in a certain period of time. However, we do not know
how more staﬀ will aﬀect service quality. This depends on what tasks the new staﬀ are
given. Following a theory based on eﬃciency, a rise in service quality could be expected
to follow the increase in staﬀ. Remember, that service quality is measured by the time a
client needs to register a new car. So, the shorter the time required, the higher product
or service quality.
However, employees can also be kept busy ineﬃciently or they can keep themselves
busy ineﬃciently. The administrators may, for instance, think up additional procedures
for dealing with their clients, ask clients to provide additional paperwork, formal docu-
ments, or to ﬁll in excessively long forms. This may also serve the purpose of using up
administrators’ time, as these forms must be read and processed, documentation needs
to be inspected and photocopied etc. This can result in no change in service quality or,
in the worst case, in a decline in service quality. Parkinson observed that the work to
be done increases in a direct ratio with the available time (Parkinson, 1957, 2). As a
consequence, the number of registrations one staﬀ member handles, i.e. the registration-
staﬀ-ratio, should have no inﬂuence at all on service time, because the additional time
each employee gains from an increase of staﬀ given the number of registrations is simply
used to extend the time needed for one car registration. Therefore, the ﬁrst hypothesis
can be derived.
Hypothesis 1 The registration-staﬀ-ratio has no inﬂuence on the average duration of
each single registration service.
Still, from a Parkinson point of view, this is not the only relevant aspect. How many
administrators are involved in one registration is also important, because "oﬃcials make
6work for each other" (Parkinson, 1957, 4). A question, for example, may well come to
two administrators and they might argue about who is to be in charge of it. Possibly
one of them may draft an answer and the other read, amend and correct it carefully
- using more time than he would have needed to answer it on his own. Even if tasks
are clearly allocated - as is probable in car registration oﬃces - each administrator has
to be familiarized with each case. The more disaggregated the organization of the car
registration process, the more administrators must become acquainted with each single
case. Furthermore, each (additional) administrator adds administrative work, because he
makes the lines of communication longer and also needs to be supervised. Consequently,
the overall waiting time for the customer will be longer the more employees that are
involved, i.e. the more disaggregated the organization of the process.
Hypothesis 2 The larger the number of administrators involved in each single registra-
tion process, the longer the waiting time.
As is known from the queueing theory, based in the ﬁeld of operations research, waiting
time, which can - as in our setting - include real waiting time plus service time, depends
on the mean service rate, the mean arrival rate of the customers and the number of service
points3. According to the queueing theory waiting time should, ceteris paribus, decrease
with the number of service points. If, during a day, 100 arbitrarily distributed customers
appear and are served at one service point, average waiting time (and average idle time)
will be longer than if 1,000 arbitrarily distributed customers appear and are served at 10
service points. This becomes intuitively clear if one considers, for example, the possibility
that one customer poses many questions to the administrator and, as a consequence,
needs much more time to be served than the average customer. In the second scenario,
were 1000 customers appear over the day, this customer will cause hardly any additional
waiting time because the following customers can be served within average waiting time
at the remaining nine service points. And the probability that 10 customers with many
questions in mind arrive at the same time, block all service points and cause longer waiting
3For a detailed description of the relationship of these three aspects in a multi-server case see for
example Hillier and Lieberman (1980, 400-424).
7times is far smaller than that one of these customers arrives in the ﬁrst scenario, blocks
the one and only service point and causes longer waiting times for all following customers.
We consider these theoretical aspects in our estimations of the hypotheses 1 and 2, too.
Parkinson also noted that administrators are bound to multiply because "an oﬃcial
wants to multiply subordinates, not rivals." (Parkinson, 1957, 4). An administrator who
considers herself overworked will probably insist on having two assistants to help her. If
she divides the work between them, she will beneﬁt from being the only one who compre-
hends them both because each of them only knows one aspect of the task to be carried
out. It is important to notice that there have to be at least two subordinates. If there was
only one assistant he would try to divide the work between himself and the administrator.
Then, the assistant would almost assume an equal status to the administrator which is
not in the interest of the former because the administrator does not want to have a rival.
The administrator does not want to risk loosing her job to the assistant if it turns out
that he is doing a better job than she is doing herself. However, if the administrator has
at least two assistants, there clearly is a hierarchical order between the administrator and
the assistants and a direct comparison between the work of the administrator and that
of the assistants becomes far more diﬃcult. Then, the position of the administrator is
not at risk. Thus, subordinates must number two or more. A bureaucracy tries to keep
itself busy so, at one point, the new assistant, will complain that he is overworked and
ask for assistance himself. To be fair, all new employees will have to have assistants and
so on (Parkinson, 1957,4-5). Hence, over time, organizations increase their administrative
staﬀ relative to other employees regardless of whether or not the administration carries
out additional tasks. A hierarchy emerges. In a strong version, the administrative staﬀ
can multiply even when output and the number of other employees both decline, as can
be seen from the way the British Navy developed after the First World War (Parkinson,
1957, 7-13).
It should be expected that the overall staﬀ of a vehicle registration oﬃce will increase
with the number of cases to be handled. However, if Parkinson’s law holds, each increase
in the number of cases handled should be followed by a disproportionately large increase
in overall staﬀ numbers because an administrative hierarchy builds up.




In order to assess the role of oﬃce and staﬀ size, and of the internal structure of the oﬃce
for the service quality, we sent a questionnaire to all 447 main vehicle registration oﬃces
in Germany in May 2004. 235 questionnaires were returned and could be used for the
analysis. This is a share of 53 per cent.
The questionnaire included questions about the tasks of the admission oﬃce, its staﬀ
(number of people and their full-time-employee-equivalents), the number of counters and
waiting room seats, the internal structure of the registration process for a new car and
the average length of time taken for a new vehicle registration from entering the building
until leaving it. We asked for annual data for the year 2003.
Our data have both strengths and weaknesses. Certainly, the high feedback rate for our
questionnaires (53 per cent) is very positive. Moreover, the questionnaires were completed
carefully and we have very few missing answers to speciﬁc questions. Admittedly there is
one main shortcoming in the data, it is that they are based on self-assessments and with
such assessments it is always possible for the data to be manipulated strategically. Each
of the oﬃces may have an incentive to claim that the waiting times are shorter than they
really are and thus appear to be providing better service. However, we have no reason to
believe that this incentive diﬀers between oﬃces. So a strategic incentive for all oﬃces to
downsize waiting time by, e.g., 10 per cent should not cause a bias.
Overall annual registrations, address and ownership changes, and deletions of regis-
trations at the local level (Kreise) were obtained from the Federal Vehicle Oﬃce (Kraft-
fahrzeugbundesamt). This also provided information about the branches of registration
oﬃces. The Federal Statistical Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt)p r o v i d e du sw i t ha n n u a l
data for local GDP and population.
94.2 Empirical model
Whereas hypotheses 1 and 2 oﬀer explanations for waiting time, hypothesis 3 attempts
to explain the size of oﬃces’ staﬀ.S o , w e h a v e t w o d i ﬀerent dependent variables and,
therefore, carried out two separate regression analyses. Let us begin with the ﬁrst two
hypotheses.
In the empirical literature, there are two ways of estimating waiting time. Lindsay
and Feigenbaum (1984) and Midttun and Martinussen (2005) both use ordinary least
squares (OLS), while Joling/Groot/Janssen (2003), for example, estimate waiting time
for doctors using a proportional hazard model. The latter method especially ﬁts well
with our ﬁndings from the queueing theory, which imply a non-linear explanation for
the waiting time. Therefore, we estimate our hypotheses using OLS and control the
results with a proportional hazard model. We use the following empirical model for both
estimation methods






3si +  i.
The independent variable di denotes the average time needed to register a new vehicle
from entering the oﬃce until leaving it in minutes (DURATION), i.e. the waiting time
plus the service time. Our unit of observation is the local jurisdiction i =1 ,...,N.
The bureaucracy variables, that simulate the mean service rate of the queueing theory,
are summarized in xi. These include the registration-staﬀ-ratio (REGISTR_FTE), i.e.
the ratio of new vehicle registrations to full time employee-equivalents, and the oﬃcers
involved in each registration process (ADMIN). These two variables are the most impor-
tant explanatory variables for hypotheses 1 and 2. However, further variables simulate
the mean service rate and are, therefore, included in xi. These are the annual cases han-
dled in one oﬃce (CASES), additional duties the oﬃc eh a st oc a r r yo u t( T A S K ) ,a n dt h e
hierarchical position of the oﬃce (INDEPEND) within the German administration. The
variable CASES consists of new vehicle registrations, changes in address or ownership and
deletions of registrations. Additional duties are those that go beyond the ones given in
the federal legislation for registration oﬃces. The variable INDEPEND measures whether
10the local oﬃce can act relatively independently of supervising authorities or not. It is a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the oﬃce is highly dependent on a supervising
authority and 0 otherwise. We also include the convenience of waiting by using the rela-
tive number of waiting room seats (SEATS_CASES) and the relation between employees
and their full time equivalents (FTQ). As not all employees work full time, the number of
employees exceeds the number of full time equivalents. Finally, we control for the number
of branches the oﬃce might have (BRANCH). A detailed description of all the variables
can be seen in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
An approximation of the mean arrival rate can be seen in the variables that refer to
diﬀerent characteristics of the local jurisdictions, such as variations in GDP or case density.
The number of cases per capita (CASES_PERS) or local GDP per capita (GDP_PERS)
in each local jurisdiction are denoted in zi. We also control for whether large car companies
that might register many new cars are located in the local jurisdiction (CarProd) and a
dummy for each state is included to control for state eﬀects. This is also denoted in zi.
Following the queueing theory, we further include the number of service points (COUNTER)
and an interaction variable (INTERACTION) where the number of counters interacts with
the new-registration-to-counter ratio in si. This nonlinear variable is well in line with the
nonlinear relation between oﬃce size and the number of counters derived from queueing
theory.
Random disturbance is  i ∼ N(0,σ 2
 ).L e twi =( xi|zi|si), then the assumptions of the
model can be summarized as follows
E( i j)=0 for i 6= j
E(wi j)=0 for all i,j (2)
We use OLS and control for heteroskedasticity using corrected standard errors. To
complement the use of state dummies, we cluster states where the assumption of in-
dependence of observations within states is relaxed. So, clustering produces "correct"
standard errors (in the measurement sense) as, even if the observations within the cluster
11are correlated, they only have to be independent across clusters. Finally, we control for
outliers.4
As it is most likely that all explanatory variables enter in a nonlinear way to determine
waiting time, we check our results obtained by the linear regression with a non-linear
regression using a duration model, i.e. the ﬁt proportional hazards model. The hazard
function describes the probability that the waiting time will be over in T,g i v e nt h ef a c t
that the person has waited until then. In our setting the hazard function is constant
which means that the process driving T is memoryless, i.e., the probability of exit in
the next interval does not depend on how much time has been spent in the initial state
(Wooldridge, 2002, 688). We also control for heteroskedasticity with corrected standard
errors.
The general setting changes slightly when hypothesis 3 is estimated, because, instead
of the waiting time, the bureaucratic structure of vehicle registration oﬃces is analyzed.
Then, the empirical model looks as follows:








4di +  i.
Now, the dependent variable mi is the the ratio of annual cases to full time employee-
equivalents (CASES_FTE). The bureaucratic variables in xi remain unchanged with one
exception. The variable REGISTR_FTE is no longer included as it is almost perfectly
correlated with the dependent variable mi. A si ne q u a t i o n1 ,zi denotes local control
variables like CarProd and local GDP per capita. The case density (CASES_PERS) is
not included because it would - in the end - only measure the relationship between local
inhabitants and full-time equivalents and this does not play a role in our setting. si is
deﬁned slightly diﬀerently. Instead of the interaction variable and the total number of
counters, we include the number of counters relative to cases (CASES_COUNTER) as
we have no reason to believe that counters should enter the regression in a nonlinear way.
Finally, the variable di denotes, again, service time.
As before, random disturbance is  i ∼ N(0,σ2
 ), all other assumptions are analogous.
4We eliminate outliers with Cooks’D larger than 1 before estimating robust standard errors. In this
case, however, no clustering is possible.
12We estimate equation 3 with OLS and use the same control tools as described above.
4.3 Empirical Results
Before we estimate the hypotheses let us ﬁrst take a brief look at the descriptives.
[Table 2 about here]
The average registration time for a new car is half an hour. However, the actual time
given diﬀers widely, between 5 and 165 minutes. The sizes of the registration oﬃces are
very diﬀerent as can be seen from the number of yearly car registrations (between 1,558
and 104,646) and the annual cases they handle, ranging from 6,868 to 421,690 with an
average of 32,658 cases. The variation in size can also be seen from the number of full-time
equivalents working there. These vary between 2 and 296 (average 16.3).
On average, one full-time employee-equivalent registered 520 cars per year (REG-
ISTR_FTE). This falls to 489 if the seven local jurisdictions where large car production
sites are located (CarProd) are excluded (REGISTR_FTE_E). Again, there is a wide
interval, ranging from 172 car registrations per full time equivalent to 3,066 (or to 2,021
without jurisdictions with large car production sites). 2.1 administrators were, on aver-
age, involved in each registration process, with a minimum of one, and a maximum of 20,
oﬃcers (ADMIN).
Whereas 70 per cent of oﬃces had no branches, 21 per cent had one and the rest had
two or more (BRANCH). 80 percent of oﬃces did not carry out more tasks than required
in the Federal Law for registration oﬃces. 9 per cent carried out one additional task,
7 percent two, and the remainder carried out more of them (TASK). While two third
of oﬃces are subordinate to another administrative body and are, therefore, relatively
dependent, one third is not (INDEPEND). The employees worked, on average, 84 per
c e n to ft h ef u l lt i m ew o r kl o a d( F T Q ) .
Looking at GDP per capita and case density in each local jurisdiction, we ﬁnd that
average GDP per capita is 24.561 €, and 18 per cent of inhabitants had a registration, a
deletion or a change of address or ownership of a car during the year. This result remains
unchanged when the seven local jurisdictions with large car production sites are excluded.
13Finally, the number of available counters (COUNTER) varies between 1 and 5, with
the absolute majority of oﬃces (52 per cent) having 2 counters. The ratio of registrations
to counters (REGISTR_COUNTER) varies between 622 and 48.006 per year with an
average of 4.724.
In section 3 we developed two hypotheses to explain the waiting time for a car reg-
istration in Germany. According to the ﬁrst, the registration-staﬀ-ratio has no inﬂuence
on the duration of the registration process. In our estimations we speciﬁed staﬀ with full
time equivalents. The results are presented in table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
In column 2 we report the results from the OLS-estimation with robust standard errors
and clustered states (estimation 1), and in column 3 the results from the OLS-regression
with robust standard errors corrected for outliers (estimation 2). In the last column
we show the estimation results from a proportional hazard model (estimation 3). In
estimation 1 and 2, the coeﬃcient of the variable REGISTR_FTE is slightly positive. So
if the number of full-time-equivalents increases the value of the variable REGISTR_FTE
decreases and waiting time declines. The corresponding coeﬃcient in the last column
is negative. In a proportional hazard model, this negative coeﬃcient shows that the
probability that, at a given point of time, someone is no longer waiting is higher, the
higher the registration-staﬀ-ratio (REGISTR_FTE); i.e. - again - the fewer registrations
a full time equivalent has to handle, the shorter the waiting time. However, all three
coeﬃcients are extremely small, and - even more important - well below any acceptable
signiﬁcance level. Thus, we ﬁnd support for hypothesis 1.
The second hypothesis derived in section 3 predicts that the more administrators are
involved in the registration process, the longer is the waiting time. The results are also
reported in table 3. We ﬁnd a very strong positive relationship between the number of
employees involved in one registration process (ADMIN) and the duration of the process
in all three estimations. The OLS-estimations produce a coeﬃcient of 1.8 and 2.0, re-
spectively. That means that one additional employee who is involved in the registration
p r o c e s sa d d sa r o u n dt w om i n u t e sw a i t i n gt i m ef o re v e r yc u s t o m e r .T h e s er e s u l t sa r es i g -
14niﬁcant at a 1-per cent-level, whereas the coeﬃcient in the proportional hazard model
is still signiﬁcant at 5 per cent. As described before, the coeﬃcient in the proportional
hazard model has a sign opposite to that of the OLS-results, i.e. it is negative. The
interpretation is the same as mentioned above: the more administrators are involved in
one registration process, the lower the probability that, at a given point of time, someone
has already been served, i.e., the longer the waiting time. Thus, we ﬁnd support for
hypothesis 2, too.5
Most of the coeﬃcients of the control variables show the expected sign but none of
them is even close to being signiﬁcant.6
We did not report the coeﬃcients for state dummies. In the OLS-regressions no single
state dummy is ever signiﬁcant. However, they are jointly signiﬁcant. Therefore, it is
important to include them. In estimation 3, the proportional hazard model, four state
dummies are signiﬁcant and if tested jointly all are signiﬁcant. As the coeﬃcients have
negative signs, the waiting time in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Saarland, and Lower
Saxonia appears to be longer than elsewhere. The ﬁrst three coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at a 1% level and the last one is still signiﬁcant at a 10%-level.
In section 3 we also derived a hypothesis for Parkinson’s idea that organizations are
bound to multiply the number of subordinates. Hypothesis 3 says that the number of
employees grows disproportionately with the number of cases.
[Table 4 about here]
In table 4 we show the results of a robust OLS-estimation that controls for outliers.
The coeﬃcient of cases (CASES) shows a negative sign, so if the number of cases in-
creases, the ratio of cases to full time equivalents (CASES_FTE) decreases. That means
that the number of full time equivalents must increase relatively more than the number
5If we run regression 1, 2, and 3 without the highly signiﬁcant variable ADMIN, the other main results
do not change.
6There is one exception. In estimation 3 the coeﬃcient of INDEPEND is signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent
level. The negative coeﬃcient shows that waiting time is longer if the admission oﬃce is subordinated
to another administrative body. From a more general point of view this could be seen as evidence for
promoting a more decentralized organization.
15of cases. The result is signiﬁcant at 1 per cent. This disproportional increase in the staﬀ
size is exactly what our hypothesis 3 predicts because administrators multiply their sub-
ordinates. And if there are more administrators in the ﬁrst place, because we have a large
registration oﬃce handling many cases, there must be even more subordinates because
the former built up a hierarchy. Therefore, the overall number of employees increases
disproportionately with oﬃce size.
Five coeﬃcients of control variables are signiﬁcant and will be discussed brieﬂy. Not
surprisingly, the coeﬃcient of the variable accounting for additional tasks a registration
oﬃce carries out (TASK) has a negative sign. The more additional tasks a registration
oﬃce carries out, the fewer registration cases per full-time equivalent occur because em-
ployees also have other duties. This result is signiﬁcant at 5 per cent. We control for
comfort by looking at the ratio between waiting room seats and cases (SEATS_CASES).
The coeﬃcient of this variable shows the expected negative sign and the variable is highly
signiﬁcant. So, if the number of waiting room seats increases, so too does the number of
full-time equivalent employees. As waiting room seats are highly correlated with oﬃce
size, this correlation simply means that there are more full-time equivalents in large oﬃces.
T h en e x ts i g n i ﬁcant control variable is the ratio of full-time equivalents to employees in
absolute numbers (FTQ). It has a negative sign, meaning that there is a positive relation
between the absolute number of employees and number of cases. As expected, the coef-
ﬁcient of the variable controlling for large production sites (CarProd) has a positive sign
and signiﬁcance is at the 1 percent level. In local jurisdictions where there is a large car
production site, the number of annual car registrations is much higher than elsewhere.
However, the number of full-time equivalents dealing with these registrations does not
have to be increased proportionately as the registration process in this context is proba-
bly highly automated. Finally, the ratio of cases to counters (CASES_COUNTER) shows
as i g n i ﬁcant positive correlation with case-to-full-time-equivalents. This means that the
number of full-time equivalents increases with the number of counters. It is most probable
that this is simply an indication for oﬃce size. The number of administrators handling a
registration (ADMIN), the number of branches (BRANCH), local wealth (GDP_PERS)
16and waiting time (DURATION) have insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients.7
In estimation 4, state dummies are not included because none of them is signiﬁcant
and they are also not signiﬁcant if tested jointly. So, states do not seem to play a role in
this question.8
Summing up, we also ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that the staﬀ size increases
disproportionately with the size of the registration oﬃce.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our results are well in line with Parkinson’s law in three aspects. First, following Parkin-
son’s observation that paperwork is elastic in its demand for time and expands with the
time available, we do not ﬁnd any correlation between staﬀ-per-registration-ratio and
waiting time. So the bureaucrat’s extra time is not used to the beneﬁt of the customer,
and this means that service quality is no better in oﬃc e st h a th a v em o r es t a ﬀ per regis-
tration. As an increase in staﬀ does not improve service quality, one has to think of other
aspects.
Second, waiting time increases with the number of administrators involved in the reg-
istration process. Thus, service quality is worse if the service procedure is disaggregated
into multiple smaller sub-services. This conﬁrms Parkinson’s ﬁndings that the bureau-
cracy keeps itself busy because each additional employee adds to administrative work.
Finally, an increase in the number of clients who are served causes a more than pro-
portionate increase in staﬀ size. This supports Parkinson’s law that the number of ad-
ministrators is sure to multiply since they want to increase the number of their assistants,
with the result that an administrative hierarchy emerges.
Our ﬁndings also point to the principal-agent-problem and stress the importance of
incentive based work contracts. Apparently, bureaucrats do not tend to work output
7All results remain unchanged if waiting time is not used as an explanatory variable in the estimations.
However, the CASES_COUNTER coeﬃcent is no longer sifniﬁcant.
8By the way, if we include state dummies the result does not change, but signiﬁcance of our main
explanatory variable, decreases somewhat (available upon request).
17oriented. (Financial) incentives as well as motivation might be more important tools to
increase eﬃciency than a simple increase of staﬀ or disaggregation of tasks.
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DURATION waiting and service time for a new vehicle registration in minutes
REGISTR annual registrations of new vehicles per oﬃce
FTE full-time employee eqivalents, i.e. hypothetic staﬀ size if all employees worked full time
REGISTR_FTE ratio new vehicle registrations (REGISTR) to full-time equivalents (FTE)
ADMIN administrators involved in each registration process
CASES annual cases = registrations, adress and ownership changes and deletions
BRANCH number of branches of a registration oﬃce
TASK additional administrative tasks the oﬃce carries out
INDEPEND = 1 if registration oﬃce is subordinated to another administrative body
FTQ ratio of full-time employee equivalents to absolute number of employees
SEATS_CASES ratio of waiting room seats to cases
CarProd = 1 if a large car production site is located in the local jurisdiction
GDP_PERS GDP per capita in each local jurisdiction
CASES_PERS cases per capita in each local jurisdiction
CASES_FTE cases per full-time equivalent
COUNTER service points or counters
REGISTR_COUNTER ratio of new registrations to counters
INTERACTION COUNTER* REGISTR_COUNTER
REGISTR_FTE_E REGISTR_FTE without CarProd = 1
Table 1: Explanation of variables.
Variable N mean s.d. min max
DURATION 233 30.3 18.7 5 165
REGISTR 235 8295.6 11500.5 1558 104646
FTE 232 16.3 22.9 2 296
REGISTR_FTE 232 519.6 302.6 172.3 3065.9
REGISTR_FTE_E 225 488.8 213.6 172.3 2021.0
ADMIN 234 2.1 1.35 1 20
CASES 235 32657.9 36685.6 6868 421690
CASES_FTE 232 2171.7 900.4 747.3 9899
BRANCH 235 .4298 .7668 0 4
TASK 235 .4085 .9355 0 6
INDEPEND 228 .6579 .4755 0 1
FTQ 232 .8406 .1234 .25 1
CarProd 235 .0298 .1704 0 1
GDP_PERS 235 24561.1 11418.6 6290.4 78018.2
CASES_PERS 235 .1849 .0339 .0428 .4418
COUNTER 235 1.8809 .7586 1 5
REGISTR_COUNTER 235 4724.1 5608.9 621.7 48005.5
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
21Variable estimation 1 estimation 2 estimation 3
REGISTR_FTE .0016 (.0038) .0049 (.0054) −.0002 (.0002)
ADMIN 1.8333∗∗∗ (.5616) 1.9719∗∗∗ (.6937) −.0768∗∗ (.0364)
CASES .0000 (.0002) −.0000 (.0002) −.0000 (.0000)
BRANCH −.5436 (1.4933) −1.5431 (1.3909) .02 (.0662)
TASK .7626 (1.5135) −.7994 (1.029) −.0656 (.0963)
INDEPEND 2.5975 (2.0557) .8541 (2.026) −.1942∗ (.1087)
SEATS_CASES −106.6207 (2347.904) −689.0284 (1598.14) −32.3941 (105.9645)
FTQ 3.7478 (12.3207) 2.9055 (9.5194) −.0546 (.7248)
CarProd -12.1807 (10.2533) -9.5716 (10.4005) .4852 (.5027)
GDP_PERS .0002 (.0001) .0001 (.0001) −.0000 (.0000)
CASES_PERS 11.7014 (52.9191) -26.4803 (46.9778) -.8814 (2.8270)
COUNTER -1.4402 (1.2122) -1.3734 (1.438) .0856 (.0673)
INTERACTION .0001 (.0005) .0002 (.0005) .0000 (.0000)
R2 .2187
F (27, 191) 2,60
LR-Test X2(27) 35,53
Dependent variable for all three estimations: DURATION, N = 219, robust standard errors in brackets.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10













F (11, 207) 18.09
Dependent variable CASES_FTE, N = 219,
robust standard errors in brackets.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * =0,10
Table 4: Regression results for oﬃce size.
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